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Abstract—The rapid spread of new radio access technologies 
and the consequent service opportunities have stimulated the 
technical and scientific community to investigate future evolution 
scenarios for 3rd Generation networks (3G), generically referred 
to as Beyond-3G or 4G. They are going to be characterized by 
ever stronger requirements for security, as well as the capability 
for the final users to experience continuous connectivity and 
uninterrupted services of IP applications as they move about 
from one access network to another. Key issues are: i) security 
provision for applications exchanging data in diverse wireless 
networks; ii) seamless mobility (handoff) between different 
coverage domains and, in case, access technologies. Since many 
proposals are based on the use of the Mobile IPv6 protocol, in 
this paper we analyze the security threats emerging from some 
Mobile IPv6 mechanisms for mobility management, and we 
propose a solution against such threats, under the assumption 
that both end users (mobile or not) are attached to a Mobile IPv6-
enabled 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem network. 
  
Index Terms—IP Multimedia Subsystem, Mobility 
management, Mobile IP version 6, Security, Inner Attacks. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE rapid advancement of wireless technologies and the 
emergence of multimedia data services have determined a 
fast evolution of mobile cellular networks towards the third 
generation (3G) in just two decades. Recently, the studies 
about next generation mobile networks have come under the 
name of Beyond-3G (B3G). The vision of a B3G network is 
that of a user-centric network providing broadband mobile 
access using different technologies and seamless global 
roaming. A B3G network will be IP-based and will allow 
mobile users to use the most appropriate technology for each 
connection and service, according to the Always-Best-
Connected (ABC) [1] concept. The organization specifically 
set up for standardization of 3G-and-beyond networks, called 
3GPP, has defined a network infrastructure, named the IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [2, 3], which adopts the Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) for signalling [4]. IMS will provide 
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all real-time multimedia services (video conferencing, 
presence services, multi-party gaming, content sharing etc.) to 
mobile users through the IP technology. 
Recent developments tend to converge towards the general 
adoption of Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [5] as the unified mobility 
layer allowing to stitch together various and mutually 
incompatible radio access technologies (WCDMA, 
CDMA2000, EDGE, WiFi, WiMAX, etc.) in order to allow 
seamless vertical (inter-technology) roaming, service 
continuity and ABC provision to mobile users. In particular, 
MIPv6 permits an IPv6 user terminal to be reached and to 
reach other users while roaming across various subnets. 
Unfortunately, MIPv6 presents some security vulnerabilities 
when adopted in heterogeneous wireless networks. In 
particular, serious security threats are currently associated to 
the delivery of messages sent by a mobile terminal, during a 
roaming activity, towards other corresponding users when 
notifying its new MIPv6 contact address.  
Our purpose is to propose an overall architecture, 
integrating the MIPv6 framework within the SIP-based IMS 
networks, which provides telephone- class security standards. 
More specifically, we improve the security level of MIPv6 
signalling messages exchanged in order to allow seamless 
session continuity in case of mobility. 
The present paper is structured as follows. After introducing 
the IMS scenario in Section 2, we describe in Section 3 the 
MIPv6 protocol, its security mechanisms and vulnerabilities. 
In Section 4 we propose our architectural solution to provide 
seamless secure mobility in a B3G IMS-based scenario. In 
Section 5 some mechanisms are described to provide secure 
MIPv6-based roaming to B3G mobile users, both in case of 
attacks from users not involved in the communication and of 
malicious behaviours by the communicating nodes themselves.  
 
II. THE IMS SCENARIO 
The IMS will play a central role in B3G all-IP networks as 
it offers telecom operators the opportunity to build a unified 
and open service infrastructure that will enable an easy 
deployment of new and rich real-time multimedia 
communication services, thus determining a merging of 
present telecommunication and data services. 
3GPP adopted SIP as the signalling protocol for setup, 
modification and tear-down of the multimedia sessions and 
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introduced the Call Session Control Function (CSCF) servers 
that represent the core elements, within the IMS, for the 
management of SIP signalling. The CSCFs perform several 
functions in relation to the received SIP messages, such as 
multimedia session control, user profile management and 
address translations. 
The CSCF functionalities are distributed among three 
different types of SIP servers (see Fig. 1): a Proxy CSCF (P-
CSCF), usually located in the Visited Network, that represents 
the first contact point for the user terminal towards the IMS 
network and takes care of forwarding the SIP signalling 
towards the subscriber’s Home Network; an Interrogating 
CSCF (I-CSCF), located in the subscriber's Home Network 
and responsible for the selection of the appropriate Serving 
CSCF (S-CSCF) according to the capacity and current 
workload of the latter; an S-CSCF, located again in the 
subscriber's Home Network, which is the main node among 
the CSCFs and processes the SIP signalling, takes decisions 
and manages the multimedia sessions. 
Another important function of the IMS architecture is the 
Home Subscriber Server (HSS), a database located within the 
Home Network that contains all the user-related subscription 
data required to handle a multimedia session: the S-CSCF 
serving the user, information on user location, security data 
and user profiles. The interaction among the three CSCF 
nodes and the HSS allows the complete management of the 
SIP signalling necessary for the establishment and support of 
the multimedia sessions.  
In such a scenario, a top priority for both users and 
operators is to achieve secure communications. Our goal is to 
increase the security level of the mobility-related signalling 
exchanges, in order to provide a robust framework 
guaranteeing certainty about roaming users’ identities, and to 
prevent session hijackings and attacks based on the mobility 
activity. The next section details a MIPv6-based approach to 
provide inter-technology seamless mobility by guaranteeing 
session continuity, and points out its specific vulnerabilities. 
III. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF MOBILE IPV6 AND 
RETURN ROUTABILITY PROCEDURE 
The Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol represents a possible 
technique to provide both vertical (inter-technology) and 
horizontal (inter-domain) seamless mobility in a B3G context. 
It is a network-layer protocol. In principle, it is possible to 
provide mobility support at the Application or Transport 
layers as well, but one needs to cope with transport-layer 
survivability issues by costly adaptations to the applications 
or provide transport-layer-based solutions, which need very 
expensive modifications to the widely deployed transport 
protocols. 
Instead, MIPv6 extends IPv6 in order to make the transport 
layer and hence applications completely unaware of the 
changes in address configurations. By means of MIPv6, 
application and transport layer protocols can always refer to a 
single IPv6 address that is permanently assigned to the MIPv6 
node, and which does not change because of mobility: such 
address is called Home Address (HoA) and remains 
unchanged regardless of the Mobile Node (MN)'s current 
location. Henceforth, by the term of MN we refer to a User 
Equipment (UE) that roams from one network to another; and 
that is identified by a permanent HoA assigned by its Home 
Network (HN) and belonging to the HN’s address space. The 
other components in the MIPv6 framework are the Home 
Agent (HA), which is a router located in the HN that maintains 
registrations of mobile nodes that are away from home, 
together with their current temporary Care-of-Addresses 
(CoAs), and the Correspondent Node (CN), which is a generic 
IPv6 node having a communication in progress with the MN. 
A correspondent node does not have to be necessarily MIPv6-
compliant. 
When the MN, while roaming away from its HN, detects a 
new access network (Visited Network – VN) through the 
Neighbor Discovery [6] mechanism or Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) [7], it acquires a 
temporary CoA from the VN (belonging to the VN’s address 
space) by means of either a stateless or stateful address 
configuration process. This mechanism ensures that the MN 
always has a temporary MIPv6 address consistent with the 
network segment (subnet) which it is currently attached to. 
Subsequently, it notifies its new current position to its HA by 
sending an appropriate Binding Update (BU) message. 
MIPv6-compliant Correspondent Nodes and Home Agents 
maintain information about MN bindings in a Binding Cache, 
whereas MNs maintain information about correspondent 
nodes in a Binding Update List. 
MIPv6 adopts the Routing Header Type 2 and the Home 
Address Option headers in order to be transparent to the upper 
layers and avoid session interruptions. As a consequence, 
every packet addressed to the MN (i.e. to its HoA) reaches the 
HA which then forwards it to the MN at its current CoA 
(triangular routing). However, MIPv6 contemplates an 
optimization of such costly mechanism: if the CN supports 
 
Fig. 1.  IP Multimedia Subsystem 
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MIPv6, the MN can choose to notify its current CoA to the 
CN, too, by sending an appropriate BU message to it; in this 
way the MN requests the CN to send further packets directly 
to its CoA. This mechanism, called Route Optimization, 
eliminates the triangular routing through the HA and hence 
reduces the end-to-end delays: this is typically necessary for 
real-time communications in order to avoid QoS degradations 
due to delay. 
Unfortunately, MIPv6 presents some security vulnerabilities 
when adopted in heterogeneous wireless networks. In 
particular, possible security threats are associated to the BU 
messages sent by the MN to its CN(s), whereas security 
between MN and HA is guaranteed by the adoption of IPsec 
[8] together with the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) 
protocol [9]. Indeed, when the MN changes access network 
and therefore acquires a new CoA, the IPSec Security 
Association (SA) between HA and MN is not affected at all: 
the use of MIPv6 Routing Header Type 2 and Home Address 
Option assures that such address change happens in a totally 
transparent way to the existing IPsec SA. That is, such a SA 
does not need to be renegotiated nor re-created, thus avoiding 
any supplementary delay in the communication. 
On the other hand, BU messages between MN and CN(s) 
can be protected by the recently proposed Return Routability 
Procedure (RRP), shown in Fig. 2. According to RRP, the 
MN sends two different messages to the CN along two 
different paths. The CN will answer with two messages 
following the same paths as the requests. In detail, after the 
acquisition of a CoA and the subsequent BU with the HA, the 
MN sends two packets to the CN carrying two different 
cookies: the first packet (Home Test Init, HoTI) is addressed 
to the HA and then routed to the CN, while the latter (Care-of 
Test Init, CoTI) is sent directly to the CN and will therefore 
follow a different route. The MN stores these cookie values in 
order to obtain some assurance that the subsequent 
corresponding answers (which will be carrying the same 
cookies) were generated by the authentic CN. 
Consequently, the CN generates a Home Keygen Token and 
a Care-of Keygen Token, as shown in Fig. 3, and sends them 
(see Fig. 2) respectively to the MN’s HoA through the HA 
(encapsulated in the Home Test – HoT answer) and directly to 
the MN’s CoA (encapsulated in the Care-of Test – CoT 
answer). 
These two tokens will then be used by the MN to generate a 
key necessary to authenticate the subsequent BU towards the 
CN. The use of two different paths and two different addresses 
(HoA and CoA) for the two test messages provides some 
proof to the CN that the MN is reachable at both its HoA (and 
then no Impersonation Attack by a third party should be under 
way) and its CoA (so as to avoid Bombing Attacks where a 
malicious MN provides a fake CoA redirecting all CN traffic 
towards a victim third party). 
The CN holds a private secret key, Kcn, and random 
numbers (nonces), which it renews at regular intervals. The 
Home Keygen Token and the Care-of Keygen Token are 
formed from the first 64 bits of the HMAC_SHA1 hashing 
function [10,11], with key Kcn, of the concatenations 
(HoA|nonce|0) and (CoA|nonce|1), respectively: 
( )( )( )64, _ 1 , | | 0cn
Home KeygenToken





( )( )( )64, _ 1 , | |1cn
Care of KeygenToken




where “|” is the concatenation operator between two binary 
strings. 
The SHA1 hashing function [11] of the concatenation of the 
Home Keygen Token and the Care-of Keygen Token provides 
the MN with the key Kbm necessary to the CN for 
authentication of the subsequent BU: 
( )1 |bmK SHA Home KeygenToken Care of KeygenToken= − . (3) 
Fig. 3 shows the structure of the resulting BU message. The 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) value is formed as the 
first 96 bits of the HMAC_SHA1 hashing function, with key 
Kbm derived in (3), of the concatenation of CoA, CN address 
 




[MAC, nonce indices, Care-of Address]
Binding Acknowledgement (BA)  (optional)
[MAC, sequence no., status]
 
Fig. 3.  BU and BA messages from MN to CN 
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and the other fields composing the standard BU message 
(BUf): 
( )( )( )96, _ 1 , | |bm f
MAC




Such MAC value is then encapsulated within the BU. If the 
authentication data of the BU is valid, the CN adds an entry in 
its Binding Cache for the particular MN and sends back a 
Binding Acknowledgement (BA) message. Upon receipt of the 
BA message, the MN adds an entry to its Binding Update List 
for the CN. 
In this procedure we can notice that the link MN-HA is 
protected by IPsec [9], but when the message from the HA is 
forwarded to the CN, it lacks any type of protection, as 
depicted in    Fig. 4. Then the risk arises that a malicious node, 
aware of a session between MN and CN, might simulate a 
handoff of the MN by sending fake HoTI and CoTI messages 
to the CN, so obtaining Kbm. Then it might send a fake BU to 
the CN in order to redirect the MN-CN communication 
towards itself (Impersonation Attack) or possibly also forward 
the traffic to the MN after analysing it (Man-In-The-Middle 
attack). 
 
IV. DEPLOYING MIPV6 IN IMS NETWORKS 
This section analyses the addressing mechanism used for 
IMS SIP-based transactions, the architectural implications of 
the SIP signalling infrastructure and the advantages of the 
integration of MIPv6 within IMS for both mobility 
management and security. 
The IMS defines a security mechanism which verifies that 
the IPv6 packet source address of SIP messages originating 
from the MN corresponds to the IPv6 address reported in the 
SIP headers, hence requiring that the MN use the same 
address (i.e., either the HoA or the CoA) for both the IPv6 
packet source address and the IPv6 address used at SIP level 
(i.e. within SIP headers). 
Therefore, several scenarios are possible for address 
management [12]. (i) The MN may use the CoA as source 
address and then provide it at SIP registration and for session 
establishment. In such a way, the MN needs to re-register the 
new CoA with the Serving-CSCF every time it changes its 
point of attachment to the network; this corresponds to using 
SIP mobility.  In real-time communications this would cause 
loss of RTP packets while the re-INVITE procedure is 
completed while not guaranteeing TCP-based session 
continuity. (ii) The MN provides both the CoA and HoA 
within SIP signalling. This requires changes to current SIP 
standards and therefore it is neither easily feasible nor 
recommended. (iii) The MN provides the HoA at SIP 
registration, for session establishment and as IPv6 source 
address. In this way the MN does not need to re-register or re-
invite other nodes when it changes CoA, but it updates the 
new CoA through MIPv6 signalling. If we suppose that the 
SIP proxy (P-CSCF), supports the MIPv6 stack, then the SIP 
application can be completely unaware of changes of the 
MN’s CoA. 
The third solution appears as the most promising by virtue 
of its efficiency and low impact on existing applications, 
protocols and nodes. 
 
V. A SOLUTION TO MIPV6 SECURITY THREATS 
A solution is now presented to address the security 
vulnerabilities reported in Sect. 3 in an MIPv6-enabled IMS 
network. 
The P-CSCF, acting as a CN for all MNs registered to the 
IMS through it, stores a Binding Update List (BUL) 
containing all the HoA–CoA associations for those MNs. At 
SIP registration, a MN provides its HoA as its SIP contact 
entity, and its current CoA, through a specific BU (updated 
after every MN handoff), which does not require the RRP 
because the link MN–P-CSCF is protected by an IPsec ESP 
tunnel. 
As in [13], we propose to create at call setup (INVITE 
message) the authentication key Kbm necessary for the 
subsequent MN-CN BU authentication procedures, and to 
distribute it to the MN and CN within the body of the SIP 200 
OK and ACK messages, instead of using the RRP procedure. 
In this way, security management is entirely delegated to the 
IMS infrastructure. Indeed, the Kbm authentication key can be 
generated by the Authentication, Authorization, Accounting 
(AAA) Server and distributed as depicted in Fig. 5. The key 
distribution is secured by the already standardized adoption of 
IPsec with ESP between any SIP user (MN and CN) and its 
own P-CSCF. It is important to highlight that this procedure is 
performed only at the beginning of a communication session, 
while the standard MIPv6 RRP between MN and CN should 
be repeated, together with the BU, after every terminal 
handoff. Such improvement can appreciably reduce end-to-
end delays during real-time communications. In fact, as shown 
in   Fig. 6, in standard MIPv6 the total handoff time is the sum 
of Td (movement detection time), Tc (configuration time), Tr 
(binding registration time) and To (route-optimization time), 
 
Fig. 4.   An RRP vulnerability 
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which includes TRRP (RRP time). In our proposal the TRRP 
delay is completely eliminated. 
We refer to [13] for further details on this mechanism and 
quantitative estimations of delay reduction. 
A. A Solution for Protection from Inner Attacks 
Note, however, that using the Kbm key alone would protect 
from attacks by third parties, but not by the mobile nodes 

































Fig. 6.  Delays during a mid-session handoff procedure [13] 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Generation and distribution of the authentication key [13] 
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themselves maliciously. For instance, as already reported in 
[14], an ill-intentioned MN could send fake BUs to various 
CNs, so making them believe it has acquired a new CoA, 
which on the contrary corresponds to the address of a 
particular user it is willing to attack (Bombing Attack). 
Obviously, if a sufficient number of different CNs is 
involved in such an attack, the resources of the victim node 
might be saturated. 
Our proposal against this kind of threats is based on the use 
of the AAA server and is essentially a generalization of our 
previous proposals in [13] and [14]. Under the assumption that 
the caller (here, MN) is the only node to require handoff 
procedures (the CN is considered to be attached to one and the 
same base station throughout the session), the AAA server 
must generate an additional key, named Ka, which is then 
distributed during the INVITE phase to P-CSCF1 and the CN, 
but not to the MN. Then, a new key distribution mechanism is 
necessary. 
It can be derived by modifying the one reported in Fig. 5, as 
described in Fig. 7. The additional key Ka is distributed to P-
CSCF1 (the operation is marked by a tag 1 in Fig. 7) and the 
CN (the S-CSCF re-introduces Ka in the ACK generated by 
the MN and addressed to the CN – tag 3 in Fig. 7) but it is not 
forwarded to the MN (P-CSCF1 removes Ka from the 200 OK 
message before sending it to the MN – tag 2 in Fig. 7). 
The MN notifies its support of the MIPv6 protocol by 
means of a Session Description Protocol (SDP) [15] attribute, 
namely a=MN:mipv6, conveyed within the SIP INVITE 
message. If present, the S-CSCF asks the AAA server for both 
the authentication key Kbm and the additional key Ka. 
B. Binding Update Procedure vs. the Proposed Security 
Key Ka 
The MN, after roaming to a new subnet (not necessarily 
controlled by a different P-CSCF) and acquiring a new CoA, 
namely CoAn, sends a BU message to its P-CSCF1; in the 
subsequent BA answer message the MN is provided with a 
value CoA–Auth generated by P-CSCF1 as a hash function 
SHA1( ) of Ka and CoAn: 
1( , )a nCoA Auth SHA K CoA− = , (5) 
as shown in Fig. 8. 
The subsequent BU from MN to CN will then include the 
value CoA–Auth instead of CoA: the former is used by the CN 
(together with Ka) to authenticate the new MN’s CoA, as 
reported in Fig. 9. The MAC is computed through (4), in order 
to avoid fake BUs generated by malicious third parties, as 
previously explained. 
It is worth noting that a new “IMS Care-of-Address 
Authentication” MIPv6 Mobility Option must be adopted, in 
order to include the CoA–Auth value in the BA and BU 
messages. 
S-CSCF1MN P-CSCF1 CNP-CSCF2AAA
INVITE     
(a=MN: mipv6)








200 OK               
(a=MN:mipv6; Ka, Kbm)
INVITE     
(a=MN:mipv6) INVITE     
(a=MN:mipv6)
200 OK       
(a=MN:mipv6)
INVITE     
(a=MN: mipv6)






Fig. 7.  Generation and distribution to P-CSCF1 and CN of the authentication key Kbm and the additional key Ka 
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C. A More General Solution for Inner Attacks Protection 
The previous solution works under the assumption that the 
MN is the only node able to move and thus to initiate a 
handoff procedure. If the called node (previously named CN, 
now MN2) is a mobile user as well, then an equivalent key 
named Ka
(2)
 must be introduced to avoid malicious operations 
by the called party. This scenario is represented in Fig. 10, 
where we assume that MN1 and MN2 are subscribed to 
different mobile operators and thus refer to different S-CSCFs, 
namely S-CSCF1 and S-CSCF2. 
Here, the AAA server, interrogated by S-CSCF1 during 
session setup, plays the role of a  AAA Proxy, which should 
contact the AAA server (connected to the HSS database) of 
MN2’s Home Network, if it is required that Ka
(2)
 be generated 
by the security infrastructure of the telecom operator 
responsible for MN2. 
In our proposal, only S-CSCF1 uses the AAA infrastructure 
(by means of the Diameter protocol [16]), in order to obtain 
the keys Kbm, Ka (if the SDP attribute a=MN1:mipv6 is 
present), and Ka
(2)
 (if MN2 supports MIPv6 and modifies the 
SDP attribute into a=MN1,MN2:mipv6 – tag 1 in Fig. 10). 
Afterwards, S-CSCF1 encapsulates the keys (tag 2 in Fig. 10) 
into the SIP 200 OK message toward the P-CSCF1, which 
removes Ka (tag 3). Then, S-CSCF1 re-introduces all the keys 
(tag 4) in the ACK message from MN1 to P-CSCF2 and MN2. 
Finally, P-CSCF2 removes Ka
(2)
 from the ACK message (tag 5) 
and forwards it toward MN2. 
In case of handoff of either MN1 or MN2, the BU 
mechanism follows, mutatis mutandis, the procedure 
described in Sect. 5.2. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we propose a way to secure MIPv6-based 
mobility within the IP Multimedia Subsystem network domain 
for seamless session mobility purposes, where the IMS 
centralized AAA server generates, manages and distributes the 
MIPv6 authentication keys involved in the Binding Update 
procedures, thus increasing security and allowing telecom 
operators to have access to all the mobility-related information 
(mobility sessions, data records, etc.). Under the assumption 
that mobile nodes are attached to the IMS, the costly MIPv6 
Return Routability Procedure is avoided, so considerably 
increasing the overall MIPv6 security level as a vulnerability 
in the Home Agent-Correspondent Node link is eliminated. 
Furthermore, the number of messages exchanged during 
handoffs between terminals and network is reduced with 
respect to standard MIPv6, and the handoff latency 
consequently minimized, as already shown in [13] and [14]. 
In particular, in this paper we address the problem of 
protecting users in case the malicious node is one of the 
mobile nodes involved in the communications and we present 
a general solution which meets such possible threats. 
However, in order to achieve this a new “IMS Care-of-
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Fig. 10.  Distribution of the keys Ka and Ka
(2), together with the BU authentication key Kbm 
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